Feri Amsari – Indonesia's national legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) has vowed to pass the Asset Forfeiture Bill into law by 15 December 2026 at the latest, following a mass protest on 27 August 2026 by residents of Pati, Central Java, in Jakarta, demanding that the bill be enacted as soon as possible.
Pati made national headlines in August last year when its residents held a series of mass rallies protesting the local administration's decision to increase the Rural and Urban Land and Building Tax (PBB-P2) by 250 per cent. Their decision to travel to Jakarta to demand the passage of the Asset Bill was, at least initially, widely seen as an extension of their activism last year (although several labour and student organisations refused to join them).
The Asset Bill, which was initiated by the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK) in 2008, has long been regarded as a critical piece of legislation in Indonesia's fight against endemic corruption. But it was not until Pati protesters stormed the DPR building in Jakarta in August that the lawmakers began treating the bill with a sense of urgency.
While lawmakers' responsiveness is, at first glance, commendable, no official draft or academic manuscript of the Bill has been released by DPR to date. Without it, the public cannot participate meaningfully in the deliberations. This lack of transparency has sparked concerns that the final form of the Asset Bill will be designed by lawmakers to serve the interests of the political elite.
The pattern is familiar, and we have seen bad precedents in recent years.
Secretive lawmaking
Public participation in lawmaking is guaranteed under Article 96 of Law 12 of 2011 on the Formation of Legislation (Undang-undang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan, UU P3) and Constitutional Court Decision 91/PUU-XVIII/2020.
The court's ruling explicitly regulates three forms of participation at the first three stages of the five-stage legislative process (planning, drafting, deliberation, approval, and promulgation). These three forms of participation consist of the right to be heard, the right to be considered, and the right to receive an explanation when public opinions are not accommodated.
These rights, however, have been ignored in the course of deliberation of a series of very important laws in recent years, including Law 3 of 2025 on the Indonesian Military, Law 5 of 2026 on the Indonesian National Police, Law 2 of 2025 on Mineral and Coal Mining (UU Minerba), Law 11 of 2020 on Job Creation, and Law 19 of 2019 on the Corruption Eradication Commission.
When a bill is deliberated in secrecy, it inevitably provokes public anger – particularly if it directly concerns the general public. Ultimately, citizens take to the streets in protest.
As mentioned, the DPR's decision to expedite the Asset Bill's deliberations appeared to have driven by public protests pushing for its passing.
Interestingly, the circumstances surrounding those protests now seem to be part of the reason why lawmakers have not been entirely transparent about the bill's content or the true motivation for deliberating it.
A scheme to rush Asset Bill's passage?
According to YouTube channel Bocor Alus, owned by Tempo magazine, the Pati residents' rally demanding the enactment of the Asset Bill may not have been entirely spontaneous.
Tempo's investigation, titled "the Role of a Gerindra Politician in the Protest over the Asset Forfeiture Bill (Peran Politikus Gerindra dalam Unjuk Rasa RUU Perampasan Aset)", identified at least three events that make the Pati demonstration suspicious.
First, according to Tempo, a member of the Gerindra Party reportedly approached the Pati community and persuaded them to stage a demonstration in Jakarta concerning the Asset Bill.
Second, Tempo claims a group of protest leaders from Pati met with members of the DPR leadership before the rally. The meeting covered the planned action in support of the Asset Bill.
Unsurprisingly, the public linked this behind-the-scenes meeting to the formal invitation later extended to the Pati demonstrators to enter the DPR's plenary chamber to express their concerns. DPR Deputy Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad of President Prabowo's Gerindra Party then met with the Pati protestors and promised that if the DPR failed to enact the Bill by 15 December 2026, he would resign not only as a DPR deputy speaker but also as a legislator.
Third, according to Tempo, the protest leaders spoke with President Prabowo via video call on Dasco's mobile phone before the rally, and the President expressed his support for their cause.
Prabowo's attitude towards the Pati protestors stands in stark contrast to his repeated ignoring of the Kamisan human rights protests about the abduction of activists in 1998. These have now been held more than 900 times in front of the Presidential Palace, to no avail.
President Prabowo has denied accusations that he orchestrated the Pati demonstration in August, although he admitted that he knew the financiers of the event, which ended in a deadly riot, with a local resident being beaten to death during the commotion.
That said, Prabowo has never categorically denied having a video call with the Pati protest leaders.
Repression by law
The alleged involvement of Gerindra Party members in facilitating the Pati demonstrations demanding the enactment of the Asset Bill has fuelled speculation that the President's party is rushing it through to serve elite interests, not the public.
This is because the bill, if enacted, could be used to repress political opponents or dissidents.
It is true that the Asset Bill is an essential component of Indonesia's anti-corruption agenda, as mandated by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). It complements Law 19 of 2019 on the Corruption Eradication Commission, Law 31 of 1999 on the Eradication of Corruption Crimes, and Law 8 of 2010 on the Prevention and Eradication of Money Laundering.
However, the Asset Bill could also be weaponised to target the financial resources of political opponents and pro-democracy civil society organisations. It is not impossible that the Bill could even be used to confiscate foreign funding received by CSOs accused of serving foreign interests.
This is because the government is planning to enact an anti-espionage Law that could classify cooperation between civil society organisations and international organisations as an activity associated with foreign intelligence operations. If this happens, provisions of the Asset Bill could be invoked to classify foreign funding as proceeds or assets associated with criminal activity and, consequently, subject it to state confiscation.
These concerns are amplified by the circulation of a video featuring Indonesian spy chief Muhammad Herindra urging vigilance over foreign funds suspected of being used for espionage activities in Indonesia. His statement is chilling given Prabowo's repeated characterisation of CSO activists as 'antek-antek asing' (foreign lackeys).
Indonesia is in the midst of ongoing remilitarisation. Does the secretive deliberation of the Asset Forfeiture Bill add to this, pushing Indonesia towards the brink of becoming a fascist state, where the law becomes a tool of political repression?