Nadirsyah Hosen – In 2024, Indonesia's hajj administration found itself at the centre of one of the most consequential legal and political controversies in recent years.
The issue revolves around an additional 20,000 hajj pilgrimage place granted by Saudi Arabia – and how the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kementerian Agama, Kemenag), under Minister Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, decided to distribute them.
Instead of following the long-standing 92:8 ratio between 'regular' and 'special' (more expensive) hajj places, the Minister opted for a 50:50 split – 10,000 for regular pilgrims and 10,000 for special pilgrims.
For many observers, including the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and a legislative committee (Pansus Haji) in the House of Representatives (DPR), this raised troubling questions of legality, transparency, and possible abuse of authority.
But beneath the political uproar lies a deeper legal puzzle – a contest over statutory construction, administrative discretion, and the limits of ministerial power.
The legal foundations
At the heart of the dispute are three key instruments: Law 8 of 2019 (UU 8 of 2019) on Hajj and Umrah; Ministerial Regulation 13 of 2021 (PMA 13 of 2021) on the Implementation of Regular Hajj; and Ministerial Decision 130 of 2024, which formalised the 50:50 distribution of the additional quota.
The 2019 Hajj and Umrah Law provides the backbone of Indonesia's hajj system. It sets out the quota mechanism, distinguishing two categories of pilgrims – regular and special hajj. Article 64 is unambiguous: 8 percent of Indonesia's total hajj quota is reserved for special hajj, and the remaining 92 per cent for regular hajj.
But Article 9 of the Law introduces another layer. It authorises the Minister to determine any additional quota (kuota tambahan) if Saudi Arabia increases Indonesia's allocation, and mandates that technical details are to be regulated through a Ministerial Regulation (Permenag).
In essence, the law creates a two-tiered structure: a fixed base quota (governed by the 92:8 ratio) and a flexible, minister-managed additional quota – provided that a regulation exists to govern its implementation.
The 2021 ministerial regulation on regular hajj (PMA 13 of 2021), issued in July 2021, was meant to operationalise the Minister's authority under Article 9(2). It details procedures for distributing quotas by province, managing the waiting list, and filling additional slots.
However – and this is the crux – Article 28 states only that any additional quota should be filled by those already registered and who have paid in the regular category. The ministerial regulation does not mention altering the 92:8 ratio or creating new proportions for special hajj.
Thus, while the ministerial regulation formally fulfils Article 9(2) of the 2019 Law, it provides no explicit legal basis for changing the quota balance. The 92:8 rule remains untouched.
When Indonesia's total 2024 quota was agreed at 241,000 (221,720 regular and 19,280 special), everything appeared consistent with the 2019 statute. But after Saudi Arabia granted an additional 20,000 slots, the Ministry allocated them equally between regular and special hajj – 10,000 each, as stipulated in the 2024 ministerial decision (SK 130 of 2024).
Kemenag justified the move by citing operational necessity. Saudi Arabia had introduced a new zoning system in Mina, where accommodation near the Jamarat (stone-throwing site) cost far more than in outer zones. The regular hajj budget could not cover premium zones, so the Ministry assigned the nearer, more expensive locations to special hajj pilgrims instead.
From Kemenag's perspective, this was not a legal violation but a context-driven administrative adjustment – a lawful act of diskresi (discretion) to preserve safety, comfort, and fairness amid logistical changes. Critics, however, saw it differently.
Two conflicting readings of the law
Minister Yaqut and Kemenag argue as follows:
- Lex specialis: Article 9 is a 'special rule' for an additional quota, giving the Minister discretion to manage exceptional situations beyond the base quota in Article 64 of the 2019 Law, which is a 'general law' (lex generalis).
- Operational discretion: PMA 13 of 2021 allows the Minister to fill additional quotas as needed (Art. 28), and the Saudi zoning overhaul created precisely the exceptional circumstance warranting adaptation.
- Administrative necessity: The 50:50 split was a proportional response to logistical and financial realities – a legitimate use of discretion to protect pilgrims.
- Temporal scope: The 92:8 ratio applies to the base quota only; extraordinary additional quotas may depart from that fixed proportion.
The KPK and the DPR have different readings of the law.
- Plain meaning: Article 64's 92/8 ratio applies to the Indonesian hajj quota – with no qualifier restricting it to the base quota. Any deviation requires parliamentary amendment.
- Regulatory silence: PMA 13 of 2021, though mentioning additional quotas, nowhere authorises deviation; its silence implies the ratio remains constant.
- Ultra vires action: The Minister's Decree (SK 130 of 2024) lacks normative foundation and effectively rewrites statutory proportions, breaching legal certainty and equality before the law.
- Opacity and accountability: Because SK 130 of 2024 was never publicly released, the allocation process appears opaque and vulnerable to corruption risk.
Why this matters
The dispute is more than just a bureaucratic tussle. The hajj quota system sits at the intersection of faith, governance, and public money. Any perception of arbitrariness undermines not only administrative integrity but also moral legitimacy.
Under Indonesia's Administrative Law (Act No. 30 of 2014), discretion is permitted only when the law is silent or incomplete – not when it is clear. Article 64 of the 2019 Law already prescribes a precise ratio. Thus, the core question is whether Article 9 of that law creates a new field of discretion or merely a procedural complement within the same rule.
If Article 9 is a lex specialis, Yaqut's decision stands on plausible ground. If not, it constitutes a breach of statutory mandate – potentially an administrative irregularity or even abuse of authority if linked to improper gain.
Up to this writing, the KPK has not officially named any suspect in its investigation of the 2024 hajj quota case. The inquiry remains at the pre-prosecution stage, with investigators examining documents, travel-agency links, and ministerial decisions.
This procedural fact cuts both ways. For Kemenag, it underscores that no proven corruption has been established and that the matter remains a policy-interpretation dispute. For KPK, it highlights the complexity of tracing accountability in a system where discretion and regulation overlap. Until formal charges are filed, the case exists in a grey zone between political accountability and criminal liability.
What should happen next
The current stalemate – with legal ambiguities unresolved, the public still in the dark about the Minister's decree, and the KPK investigation still ongoing – demands more than political noise. It requires institutional clarity and transparent follow-through. Indonesia cannot afford to let its hajj administration operate in a perpetual grey zone where good faith is assumed but never verified.
Several immediate steps would help restore confidence and prevent the same controversy from recurring:
- Publish SK 130/2024 in full; transparency is the first condition of legitimacy.
- Clarify the Ministerial Regulation to state clearly whether additional quotas are bound by the 92/8 rule.
- Ensure DPR and KPK oversight focuses on legality and procedure, not political rivalry.
- Legislative reform of UU 8/2019 should resolve ambiguity about additional quotas and ministerial powers.
Importantly, Indonesia has now enacted Law No. 14 of 2025, establishing a new, independent Ministry of Hajj and Umrah, separated from Kemenag. The reform aims to enhance transparency, improve service quality, and prevent conflicts of interest.
This institutional shift offers hope – but not automatic salvation. Structural reform must be followed by clear regulations, data transparency, and external auditing to prevent the same interpretive gaps that fuelled the 2024 controversy. Whether the new ministry can break old habits or merely inherit them will test Indonesia's administrative maturity.
At a crossroad
The 2024 hajj quota controversy is far more than a question of numbers. It exposes the fragile line between lawful discretion and unlawful deviation in Indonesia's bureaucracy.
Yaqut's defenders view his decision as a pragmatic response to Saudi zoning changes – a necessary flexibility in extraordinary times. His critics see a dangerous precedent for unchecked ministerial power and blurred accountability.
As the KPK continues its inquiry without naming suspects and the new Hajj and Umrah Ministry takes shape, Indonesia stands at a crossroads. The challenge is to ensure that faith, integrity, and law move together – that future hajj governance is guided not by ambiguity, but by clarity and trust.